A policy is said to be robust if it maximizes the reward while considering a bad, or even adversarial, model. In this work we formalize two new criteria of robustness to action uncertainty. Specifically, we consider two scenarios in which the agent attempts to perform an action a, and (i) with probability α, an alternative adversarial actionā is taken, or (ii) an adversary adds a perturbation to the selected action in the case of continuous action space. We show that our criteria are related to common forms of uncertainty in robotics domains, such as the occurrence of abrupt forces, and suggest algorithms in the tabular case. Building on the suggested algorithms, we generalize our approach to deep reinforcement learning (DRL) and provide extensive experiments in the various Mu-JoCo domains. Our experiments show that not only does our approach produce robust policies, but it also improves the performance in the absence of perturbations. This generalization indicates that action-robustness can be thought of as implicit regularization in RL problems. π * P,α P,α .
Introduction
Recent advances in Reinforcement Learning (RL) have demonstrated its potential in real-world deployment. However, since in RL it is normally assumed that the train and test domains are identical, it is not clear how a learned policy would generalize under small perturbations. For example, consider the task of robotic manipulation in which the task is to navigate towards a goal. As the policy is trained on a specific parameter set (mass, friction, etc...), it is not clear what would happen when these parameters change, e.g., if the robot is slightly lighter/heavier. * The advantage of robust policies is highlighted when considering imperfect models, a common scenario in real world tasks such as autonomous vehicles. Even if the model is trained in the real world, certain variables such as traction, tire pressure, humidity, vehicle mass and road conditions may vary over time. These changes affect the dynamics of our model, a property which should be considered during the optimization process. Robust MDPs (Nilim & El Ghaoui, 2005; Iyengar, 2005; Wiesemann et al., 2013) tackle this issue by solving a max-min optimization problem over a set of possible model parameters, an uncertainty set, e.g., the range of values which the vehicle's mass may take -the goal is thus to maximize the reward, with respect to (w.r.t.) the worst possible outcome.
Previously, Robust MDPs have been analyzed extensively in the theoretical community, in the tabular case (Nilim & El Ghaoui, 2005; Iyengar, 2005; Xu & Mannor, 2007; Mannor et al., 2012; Wiesemann et al., 2013) and under linear function approximation (Tamar et al., 2013) . However, as these works analyze uncertainty in the transition probabilities: (i) it is not clear how to obtain these uncertainty sets, and (ii) it is not clear if and how these approaches may be extended to non-linear function approximation schemes, e.g., neural networks. Recently, this problem has been tackled, empirically, by the Deep RL community (Pinto et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2018) . While these approaches seem to work well in practice, they require access and control of a simulator and are not backed by theoretical guarantees -a well known problem in adversarial training (Barnett, 2018) .
Our approach tackles these problems by introducing a natural way to define robustness -robustness w.r.t. action perturbations -a scenario in which the agent attempts to perform an action and due to disturbances, such as noise or model uncertainty, acts differently than expected. In this work, we consider two distinct robustness criteria: given an action provided by the policy (i) the Probabilistic Action Robust MDP (PR-MDP, Section 3) criterion considers the case in which, with probability α, a different possibly adversarial action is taken; and (ii) the Noisy Action Robust MDP (NR-MDP, Section 4) criterion, in which a perturbation is added to the action itself. These two criteria are strongly correlated to real world uncertainty; the former correlates to abrupt interruptions such as a sudden push and the latter cor-relates to a constant interrupting force. For instance, if the robot is heavier, this may be seen as an adversary applying force in the opposite direction (Başar & Bernhard, 2008) .
In Section 6, we extend our approach to Deep RL, perform extensive evaluation across several MuJoCo (Todorov et al., 2012) environments and show the ability of our approach to produce robust policies. We empirically analyze the differences between the PR-MDP and NR-MDP approaches, and demonstrate their ability to produce robust policies under abrupt perturbations and mass uncertainty. Surprisingly, we observe that even in the absence of perturbations, solving for the action robust criteria results in improved performance 1 .
Preliminaries

Markov Decision Process
We consider the framework of infinite-horizon discounted Markov Decision Process (MDP) with continuous action space. An MDP is defined as the 5-tuple (S, A, P, R, γ) (Puterman, 1994) , where S is a finite state space, A is a compact and convex action metric space. We assume P ≡ P (s | s, a) is a transition kernel and is weakly continuous in a, R ≡ r(s, a) is a reward function continuous is a, and γ ∈ (0, 1). Let π : S → P(A) be a stationary policy, where P(A) is the set of probability measures on the Borel sets of A. We denote Π as the set of stationary deterministic policies on A, i.e., if π ∈ Π then π : S → A, and P(Π) as the set of stationary stochastic policies. Let v π ∈ R |S| be the value of a policy π, defined in state s as v π (s) ≡ E π [ ∞ t=0 γ t r(s t , a t ) | s 0 = s], where a t ∼ π(s t ) is a random-variable, E π denotes expectation w.r.t. the distribution induced by π and conditioned on the event {s 0 = s}.
The goal is to find a policy π * , yielding the optimal value v * , i.e., for all s ∈ S, π * (s) ∈ arg max π ∈P(Π) E π [ ∞ t=0 γ t r(s t , a t ) | s 0 = s], and the optimal value is v * (s) = v π * (s). It is known, and quite surprising, that there always exists an optimal policy which is stationary and deterministic, meaning π * ∈ Π, e.g., (Puterman, 1994) [Theorem 6.2.10].
We note that in all following results we assume continuity of the dynamics and reward in actions. For the exact definitions see Appendix A.1, Assumption 1.
Zero-Sum Games
As opposed to the standard MDP framework, in a two player zero-sum game, the reward function and transition kernels are functions of both players a ∈ A andā ∈Ā, where A,Ā are compact sets. Assuming the policy of player 1 is π andπ of player 2, the value of the game is defined Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970) generalized result of Shapley (1953) and established that, under proper conditions, the zero sum game has value, i.e., for any s ∈ S, v * (s) = max
Note that, in the general case, the optimal maximizing policy is selected from the set of stochastic policies. Policies which attain this value, π * andπ * for the maximizer and minimizer players, respectively, are said to be in Nash-Equilibrium. In such a scenario, neither player may improve it's outcome further, e.g., ∀π,π ∈ P(Π), v π,π * ≤ v * ≤ v π * ,π .
Probabilistic Action Robust MDP
In this section we introduce the Probabilistic Action Robust MDP (PR-MDP), which can be viewed as a zero-sum game between an agent and an adversary. We refer to the optimal policy of the max-agent in PR-MDP as the optimal probabilistic robust policy. Furthermore, we establish that the game has a well defined value and analyze some properties of this criterion. Lastly, we formulate Policy Iteration (PI) schemes that solve the PR-MDP, and show that they inherit properties corresponding to single agent PI schemes.
Definition 1. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A Probabilistic Action Robust MDP is defined by the 5-tuple of an MDP (see Section 2.1). Let π,π be policies of an agent an adversary. We define their probabilistic joint policy π mix P,α (π,π) as ∀s ∈ S, π mix P,α (a | s) ≡ (1 − α)π(a | s) + απ(a | s).
Let π be an agent policy.
As opposed to standard MDPs, the value of the policy is defined by v π P,α = minπ ∈Π E π mix P,α (π,π) [ t γ t r(s t , a t )], where a t ∼ π mix P,α (π(s t ),π(s t )). The optimal probabilistic robust policy is the optimal policy of the PR-MDP π * P,α ∈ arg max
The optimal probabilistic robust value is v * P,α = v (see Appendix B.1 for a formal mapping). It is well known (Straffin, 1993) that any zero-sum game has a well defined value on the set of stochastic policies, but not always on the set of deterministic policies. Interestingly, and similarly to regular MDPs, the optimal policy of the PR-MDP is a deterministic one as the following proposition asserts (see proof in Appendix B.2).
Proposition 1. For PR-MDP, there exists an optimal policy which is stationary and deterministic, and strong duality
Probabilistic Action Robust and Robust MDPs
Although the approach of PR-MDP might seem orthogonal to the that of Robust MDPs, the former is a specific case of the latter. By using the PR-MDP criterion, a class of models is implicitly defined, and the probabilistic robust policy is optimal w.r.t. the worst possible model in this class.
To see the equivalence, define the following class of models,
A probabilistic robust policy, which solves (1), is also the solution to the following RMDP (see Appendix B.3),
where E π P is the expectation of policy π when the dynamics are given by P . This relation explicitly shows that π * P,α is also optimal w.r.t. the worst model in the class P α , R α , which is convex and rectangular uncertainty set (Epstein & Schneider, 2003) , and formalizes the fact that PR-MDP is a specific instance of RMDP.
Policy Iteration Schemes for PR-MDP
In this section, we analyze Policy Iteration (PI) schemes that solve (1). Although a Value-Iteration procedure can be easily derived, we focus on the possible PI schemes. PI schemes are central to the currently used actor-critic approaches in continuous control, which we focus on in our experiments. We present two algorithms, Probabilistic Robust PI (Algorithm 1) and Soft Probabilistic Robust PI (Algorithm 2), and discuss the relation between the two.
The Probabilistic Robust PI (PR-PI, Algorithm 1) is a two player PI scheme adjusted to solving a PR-MDP (e.g., Rao et al. (1973) ; Hansen et al. (2013) ). PR-PI repeats two stages, (i) given a fixed adversary strategy, it calculates the optimal counter strategy, and (ii) it solves the 1-step greedy policy w.r.t. the value of the agent and adversary mixture policy. As suggested in Shani et al. (2018) , Section 3.1, stage (i) may be performed by any MDP solver.
The Soft Probabilistic Robust PI (Soft PR-PI, Algorithm 2) is updated using gradient information, unlike the PR-PI. Instead of updating the adversary policy using a 1-step greedy update, the adversary policy is updated using a Frank-Wolfe update (Frank & Wolfe, 1956) . The Franke-Wolfe update, similar to the gradient-projection method, finds a policy which is within the set of feasible policies; as, for instance, the gradient may produce policies out of the simplex. It works by finding the valid policy with the highest correlation, i.e., inner product, with the direction of gradient descent and performs a step towards it. As a convex mixture of two policies is a valid policy, the new policy is ensured to be a valid one.
Although the two algorithms might seem disparate, Soft PR-PI merely generalizes the 'hard' updates of PR-PI to 'soft' ones. This statement is formalized in the following proposition, which is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 in Scherrer & Geist (2014), see proof in Appendix B.4. Proposition 2. Let π,π be general policies. Then, arg min π ∈Π rπ + γPπ v π mix P,α (π,π) = arg min π ∈Π π , ∇πv π mix P,α (π,π) |π =π .
Notice that the first single agent, 1-step improvement, has a solution in the set of deterministic policies (since the action space is a compact set and the argument is continuous in the action). Thus,π in Algorithm 2 is exactly the 1-step greedy policy used in Algorithm 1. This suggests that for η = 1 Algorithm 2 is completely equivalent to Algorithm 1.
Generally, in two-player PI, the improvement stage amounts to solving a max-min, 1-step, decision problem. In PR-PI it is clearly not the case; in the improvement stage, a single agent, 1-step-greedy policy, is solved. Solving the latter is easier than solving the former, and it is a result of the specific structure of PR-MDP which does not generally hold, as will be demonstrated in Section 4.
The following result shows that in both algorithms the value converges to the unique optimal value of the Nash-Equilibrium (see proof in Appendix B.5). = v π mix P,α (π k ,π k ) . Then, for any η ∈ (0, 1], in Algorithm 2, v k contracts toward v * P,α with coefficient (1 − η + γη), i.e.,
Due to the equivalence of Algorithms 1 and 2 (when η = 1), Algorithm 1 Probabilistic Robust PI Initialize: α,π 0 , k = 0 while not changing do π k ∈ arg max π v π mix P,α (π ,π k ) π k+1 ∈ arg minπ rπ + γPπv π mix P,α (π k ,π k ) k ← k + 1 end while Return π k−1 Algorithm 2 Soft Probabilistic Robust PI Initialize: α, η,π 0 , k = 0 while criterion is not satisfied do π k ∈ arg max π v π mix P,α (π ,π k ) π ∈ arg minπ π , ∇πv π mix P,α (π k ,π) |π =π k π k+1 = (1 − η)π k + ηπ k ← k + 1 end while Return π k−1 we get as a corollary that PR-PI converges toward the unique Nash-Equilibrium.
Remark 1. The solution method of the arg max and arg min in both Algorithms 1 and 2 can be swapped and the convergence guarantees remain, e.g.,π is the optimal solution to the MDP given π, whereas π is updated using the 1-step greedy approach w.r.t.π.
Remark 2. Although Soft PR-PI converges slower than the non-soft version, it is reasonable to assume the former will be less sensitive to errors than the latter. Soft PR-PI can be seen as a generalization of Conservative PI (CPI) to solving PR-MDPs. CPI is known to be less sensitive to errors than other PI schemes (Scherrer & Geist, 2014) . Nonetheless, the error analysis for Soft PR-PI is substantially different than the one CPI (Kakade & Langford, 2002; Scherrer, 2014) . In Soft PR-PI, small changes in the adversarial policy may result in dramatic changes in the agent's policy. Thus, the γ-weighted state occupancy under a measure ν, d π mix P,α (π k ,π k ) ν = t γ t νP π mix P,α (π k ,π k ) , may change dramatically between iterations, whereas in CPI the change is smooth. We leave the error analysis for future work.
Noisy Action Robust MDP
In this section we consider an alternative definition for action robustness. Instead of a stochastic perturbation in the policy space, as in Section 3, we consider a perturbation in the action space. To formally study such a perturbation we define the Noisy Action Robust MDP (NR-MDP), which, similarly to the PR-MDP, can be viewed as a zero-sum game (see Appendix C.1 for a formal mapping). We continue by establishing some properties of this MDP while highlighting important differences relative to the approach of PR-MDP.
Definition 2. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A Noisy Action Robust MDP is defined by the 5-tuple of an MDP (see Section 2.1). Let π,π be policies of an agent and an adversary. We define their noisy joint policy π mix N (π,π) as ∀s ∈ S, π mix N (a | s) ≡ E b∼π(·|s) b∼π(·|s)
the relation is obtained by the fact that a ∼ π,ā ∼π.
Let π be an agent policy. For NR-MDP, its value is defined by v π N,α = minπ ∈Π E π mix N (π,π) [ t γ t r(s t , a t )], where a t ∼ π mix N (π(s t ),π(s t )). The optimal α-noisy robust policy is the optimal policy of the NR-MDP
The optimal noisy robust value is v *
In simple terms; an optimal noisy robust policy is optimal w.r.t. a scenario, in which an adversary may change the agent's actions by adding bounded perturbations; the action performed on the system is (1 − α) a +αā, whereā is an action drawn from possibly adverserial distributionπ. The adversary's ability to add perturbations is controlled through the parameter α. Each value of α defines a new continuousaction NR-MDP, where for α = 0 the adversary is unable to affect the system and the decision problem collapses to the standard, non-robust, MDP formulation.
The assumption on the structure of A is required, in order to ensure that the α-mixture actions are valid actions, an assumption which holds naturally in the domain of continuous control. This approach formalizes a specific meaning for perturbation in the action space.
Although the approach of PR-MDP (Section 3) and NR-MDP are closely related, they are not equivalent and important differences exist between the two. Unlike PR-MDP, for which a deterministic stationary optimal policy exists, generally, for NR-MDP it is not the case. The optimal noisy robust policy, in the general case, is a stochastic policy (see proof in Appendix C.2).
Proposition 4. There exists an NR-MDP such that,
Furthermore, strong duality does not necessarily hold on the class of deterministic policies, Π.
The above proposition (see Appendix C.2) tells us that while it is often easier to focus on deterministic strategies (policies), when considering the NR-MDP scenario the optimal strategy may be stochastic. A similar notion has been shown to hold in non-cooperative matrix games (Nash, 1951) , in which the optimal strategy is stochastic.
Policy Iteration for NR-MDPs
In section 3.2, we formulated PI schemes to solve PR-MDPs. Unlike two-player zero-sum PI (Rao et al., 1973; Hansen et al., 2013) , in PR-PI (Algorithm 1) a single agent decision problem is solved, when the adversary policyπ k+1 is updated. This structure is indeed unique to the PR-MDP, and does not hold when generalizing two-player zero-sum PI to solve NR-MDP.
Specifically, consider the two-player zero-sum PI that repeats the following two stages:
] are the induced reward and dynamics from by π mix N,α (π,π). Following similar lines of proof as in Hansen et al. (2013) or as in Theorem 3, a similar γ-contraction result may be achieved for the NR-MDP, e.g.,
In such an algorithm, stage (1) is performed by solving an MDP, as in PR-PI. However, stage (2) requires solving a 1-step min-max problem. For general reward and transition probabilities it cannot be solved by solving a single-agent decision problem, as in the second stage of PR-PI (Algorithm 1). Furthermore, the solution of stage (2) cannot be achieved by a single-call to a gradient oracle as in Proposition 2 (we elaborate the discussion in Appendix C.3).
Regardless of these differences, in Section 6, we will use the approach of Soft PR-PI and offer DRL algorithms to solve both the PR and NR MDPs. While the approach we consider in Section 6 should be understood as a heuristic for solving NR-MDP, it is based on Algorithm 2, which guarantees convergence for PR-MDP in the error-free case.
Related Work
Robust RL: Traditional works in RL, such as Nilim & El Ghaoui (2005) and Iyengar (2005) have provided efficient algorithms for solving Robust MDPs, with uncertainty in the transition probabilities. Mannor et al. (2012) extended their approach to non-rectangular uncertainty sets, e.g., coupled uncertainty sets. However, these approaches are limited to solutions in the tabular case. Additionally, a connection between robustness and generalization has been suggested (Xu et al., 2009; Xu & Mannor, 2012) , while it is not clear how this holds in RL, we believe that there lies a similar yet complex connection between the two concepts.
Control: Obtaining robust policies in continuous control problems has been extensively investigated in the past. Most closely related to our work, are max-min Robust Control approaches (e.g., Bemporad et al. (2003) ; Kerrigan & Maciejowski (2004) ; de la Pena et al. (2006) . In this line of work, a control policy which is robust w.r.t. deterministic perturbations is calculated. There, the max-min problem is solved via Linear program, Quadratic program or by an explicit tree-search. Here, we focus on PI, and gradient based, schemes to solve a more specific problem; action robust policies. Furthermore, and to the best of our knowledge, in this line of works, discussion on the existence of strong-duality does not exists (i.e., as Proposition 1 and 4 assert for PR-and NR-MDPs).
Robust Supervised Learning: Similar to the Robust MDPs framework, robustness to adversarial examples/attacks (Szegedy et al., 2013) is a measure of robustness in supervised learning. A method of learning robust classifiers is through Generative Adversarial Networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014) . Similar to our approach, when using GANs for robustness, an adversary learns to create small perturbations in the input data in an attempt to cause a misclassification (Xiao et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018; Kurakin et al., 2018) . While these methods work well in practice, they generally lack convergence proofs and should thus be treated as heuristics.
Experiments
Method
Our approach adapts the Soft PR-PI algorithm to the high dimensional scenario. While in the tabular case we may use an MDP solver, which produces the optimal policy, when considering parametrized policies, e.g., neural networks, a dual-gradient approach is taken. In the exact case, the MDP solver step corresponds to performing gradient ascent until convergence; and the projected gradient descent step, performed by the adversary, can be solved using a single gradient descent step, as the network parametrization takes care of the projection operator (e.g., using a tanh / softmax output function). As, in practice, it is hard to measure convergence; we train the actor for N gradient steps followed by a single adversary gradient step.
We focus on a robust variant of DDPG which we call Action-Robust DDPG (see Appendix D, Algorithm 5). In DDPG (Lillicrap et al., 2015) , the output of the policy network is a deterministic policy µ θ : S → A. As opposed to DDPG, in Action-Robust DDPG two networks output two deterministic policies, the actor and adversary policies, denoted by µ θ andμθ. The critic is trained to estimate the q-function of the joint-policy. For PR-MDP (Definition 1), the joint policy is
whereas for NR-MDP (Definition 2), the joint policy is,
. (4) The following result generalizes DPG (Silver et al., 2014) for both PR and NR-MDPs. i.e., it establishes how to update θ andθ using a deterministic gradient based method.
Proposition 5. Let µ θ ,μθ be the agent's and adversary's deterministic policies, respectively. Let π(µ θ ,μθ) be the joint policy given the agent and adversary policies. i.e., for PR-MDP π = π mix P,α (3), and for NR-MDP π = π mix N,α (4). Let J(π(µ θ ,μθ)) = E s∼ρ π [v π (s)] be the performance objective. The gradient of the actor and adversary parameters, for both PR-and NR-MDP is:
where for the PR-MDP we have a = µ θ (s) andā =μθ(s), and for the NR-MDP a =ā = (1 − α)µ θ (s) + αμθ(s).
A proof, example algorithm and block diagram are provided in Appendix D.
We focus on the various MuJoCo domains (Todorov et al., 2012) , in which we test the ability of our approach to produce policies which are robust to common uncertainty schemes. Intuitively, our Probabilistic operator is correlative to the occurrence of large abrupt forces, e.g., someone suddenly pushes the robot, whereas the Noisy operator is correlative to mass uncertainty, e.g., the robot is heavier or lighter.
The Action-Robust DDPG has several parameters that need to be tuned. The scalar α which measures the adversary's 'strength', the type of exploration scheme, and the ratio between the number of gradient steps of the actor and adversary. We tune these parameters for both PR and NR-MDP approaches by a naive parameter scan; we find optimal parameter given the others are fixed, as we show in Figure 1 . The parameters we choose are the ones that attain the best performance on the Hopper domain.
We test the selected configuration, across a range of continuous control tasks in MuJoCo, on a robustness to abrupt forces and model uncertainty task (see Figure 2 ). We end the experiments section with an attempt to provide some additional insight into how and why the approach works, in addition to how the empirical results coincide with the theoretical guarantees.
Theory versus Practice
Our theoretical approach, Soft PR-PI (Algorithm 2), is proven for the PR-MDP. The algorithm is based on a dynamic programming approach, (i) given a fixed adversary policy, solves the optimal agent's policy, (ii) updates the adversary policy using gradients.
1. While in theory, for the PR criterion, there exists a deterministic optimal policy -this does not necessarily hold for the NR case (Proposition 4). Thus searching over the space of deterministic policies is sub-optimal. 2. Theoretical approaches in general require exact computation, however, in practice, we use function approximation schemes, e.g., deep neural networks. As such, convergence can not be ensured and the approach should be seen as a heuristic.
Regardless of these differences, we based the empirical approach for both PR and NR-MDPs on Algorithm 2.
Parameter Ablation
The parameters we consider are shown in Table 1 . In addition, we consider 3 exploration schemes: noiseless (onpolicy exploration), Ornstein Ulenbeck (OU, Uhlenbeck & Ornstein (1930) ) and Parameter noise (Plappert et al., 2017 ).
TRAINING
Each configuration, is trained on 5 random seeds and evaluated across 100 episodes. The evaluation is performed without adversarial perturbations, on a range of mass values not encountered during training. We compare to the non-robust DDPG with parameter space noise, the best performing method in the Hopper-v2 domain.
VALIDATION
PR-MDP Selected Parameters: Figure 1 presents the ablation results. For the PR criterion, we see that the optimal exploration scheme is OU noise, the perturbation parameter α is 0.1 (optimal under the worst case mass perturbation during the evaluation) and the number of Actor gradient steps (per each single Adversary step) is 10.
NR-MDP Selected Parameters:
A similar analysis for the noisy robust criterion reveals that the optimal performing exploration scheme is the noiseless scenario, α = 0.1 and 20 Actor gradient steps per each Adversary step.
These results highlight the differences between the PR and NR-MDP approaches. Not only does each exploration scheme affect them differently, but also the value of α. For instance, in the NR-MDP, for a relatively large value of α (0.2) we can see that the policy is unable to gain meaningful performance; however, in the PR-MDP, in this domain, the agent still benefits from performance improvement under relatively large perturbations during training.
Furthermore, notice that for both PR and NR-MDP, the result with no exploration noise (Figure 1 update rule. The PR and NR-MDP criteria, induce sufficient amount of exploration, and relaxes the need for a manually determined exploration (e.g., by adding Gaussian noise). Failures: It is also important to acknowledge the scenarios in which our algorithm does not outperform the baseline. Such an example is the InvertedPendulum domain, in which the performance of the robust operators was found to be NR-MDP PR-MDP inferior to that of its non-robust counterpart. We find two possible explanations for this phenomenon (i) the parameter tuning is performed on the Hopper domain (as opposed to selecting the optimal parameters per each domain). As each domain is different, it is plausible that good parameters in a certain domain would not be good in all domains. (ii) Specifically in the InvertedPendulum domain, where the task is to balance a pole, an adversary which is too strong (large α value) prevents the agent from solving the task.
Testing on various MuJoCo domains
Diving Deeper
We attempt to analyze the behavior of our criteria (Figure 3 ) by asking two questions: (i) Does the performance increase due to the added perturbations from the adversary, or does the operator itself induce a prior, e.g., regularization, on the policy which leads to improved performance. (ii) How close is the empirical behavior to its theoretical counterpart.
Off-Policy Action Robustness: In previous experiments, during training, the action was drawn from the joint policy of the agent and adversary, where the joint policy is specified in the PR and NR-MDP approaches (see Definition 1,2).
A natural alternative approach is to act with the actor's policy, yet, to acquire an action-robust policy in an off-policy fashion. Meaning, use the same algorithms while obtaining the data without the effect of the adversary. A possible advantage of such an approach is minimizing the number of bad actions (since the adversary does not intervene), while still benefiting from the presence of robust learning. Figure 3 presents the results of this experiment. For the NR-MDP, the off-policy learning leads to significantly better results, relatively to the on-policy learning counterpart. Surprisingly, an opposite effect is observed for the PR-MDP. There, the off-policy nature, e.g., not acting with the adversarial policy, leads to performance degradation.
Does MaxMin equal MinMax? While so far we trained our agent through N actor updates followed by a single adversary gradient update, this corresponds to the MinMax operator, in theory the opposite should result in an identical performance (Proposition 1) for the PR-MDP approach, and to deteriorate the performance for the NR-MDP approach (Proposition 4) Experimentally (Figure 3) we see a mixed result. For the PR-MDP, indeed there exists a large correlation between the theoretical results and those seen in practice. We can see that the results are similar to the regular ratio ( Figure 1 ) with slight improvement. However, for NR-MDP approach, the opposite is observed. Flipping the ratio order, which is supposed to provide more power to the adversary and in turn degrade the performance, actually leads to an improvement (see ratio of 1:10). This is surprising, as theoretically, one would expect the opposite outcome.
Summary
We have presented two new criteria for robustness, the Probabilistic and Noisy action Robust MDP, related each to real world scenarios of uncertainty and discussed the theoretical differences between both approaches. Additionally; we developed the Soft PR-PI (Algorithm 2), a policy iteration scheme for solving PR-MDPs. Building upon the Soft PR-PI algorithm, we presented a deep reinforcement learning approach, which is capable of solving our criteria. We compared both criteria, analyzed how the various parameters affect the behavior and how the empirical results correlate (and occasionally contradict) with the theoretical approach. Most importantly, we notice that not only does training with our criteria result in robust policies, but our approach improves performance even in the absence of perturbations.
Lastly, for solving an action-robust policy, there is no need in providing an uncertainty set. The approach requires only a scalar value, namely α (or possibly a state-dependent α(s)), which implicitly defines an uncertainty set (see Section 3.1). This is a major advantage compared to standard robust approaches in RL and control, which, to the best of our knowledge, require a distribution over models or perturbations. Of course, this benefit is also a restriction -the Action Robust approach is unable to handle any kind of worst-case perturbations. Yet, due to its simplicity, and its demonstrated performance, it is worthwhile to be considered by an algorithm designer.
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A. Discounted Markov Games
A.1. Preliminaries
We define the framework of discounted, two-player zero-sum Markov Games (MG) with finite state space and continuous action space. A MG is determined by the 5-tuple (S, A, B, P, R, γ) (Patek, 1997 
and is a stochastic matrix. Following notation from Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970) , we denote P A and P B as the set of probability measures on the Borel sets of A and B, respectively.
Definition 3. The value of fixed strategy µ, ν is given by v µ,ν = ∞ t=0 γ t (P µ,ν ) t r µ,ν . Given a fixed ν ∈ P B the value of the optimal counter strategy of player A is v ν = sup µ∈P A v µ,ν . Accordingly, for a fixed µ ∈ P A the value of the optimal counter strategy of player B is v µ = inf ν∈P B v µ,ν . Furthermore, if the sup and inf are attainable, we refer to arg min ν∈P B v µ,ν and arg max µ∈P A v µ,ν as optimal counter strategies to µ and ν, respectively.
We make the following assumptions on the dynamics and reward functions. Assumption 1.
• Both A, B are compact metric spaces.
• For any s ∈ S the reward r is continuous and bounded function on A × B.
• For any s ∈ S, whenever (a n , b n ) → (a, b), where (a n , b n ), (a, b) ∈ A × B, then P (· | s, a n , b n ) converges weakly to P (· | s, a, b).
In the rest of the section we follow (Patek, 1997) [Section 2-3] that analyzed zero-sum MG for stochastic shortest paths, while performing minor modifications for the discounted and continuous action-space setup.
Define the following Bellman operators. T µ,ν v = r µ,ν + γP µ,ν v,
where equality holds component-wise.
Notice that the max and min are attainable since P A , P B are compact sets. Furthermore, by Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970) [Lemma 2.2] and under Assumption 1, both the max and min are continuous and bounded. Thus, we can replace sup inf and inf sup by corresponding max and min.
We have the following important lemma.
Proof. Following similar arguments as in Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970) , Equation 2, and using Sion's minimax theorem (Sion et al., 1958) [Theorem 3.4], for any s ∈ S we have that,
Since P A , P B are compact and r µ,ν + P µ,ν v is bounded and continuous on A × B for any s ∈ S, the sup, inf can be replaced by min, max (e.g., by Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970) [Lemma 2.2]).
The analysis in Patek (1997) is based on assumption R, which results in T v =T v. Since we allow the agents to use mixed-strategies, according to Lemma 6, we obtain T v =T v in our setup as well. Furthermore, since we use discounted MG, assumption SSP in Patek (1997) is also satisfied. Every strategy (µ, ν) is proper; it terminates with probability one, as the discount factor (γ) is smaller than 1.
Lemma 7. T µ,ν , T µ ,T ν , T are γ contractions in the sup-norm.
Proof. We follow similar technique as in Patek (1997) , adjusted to our setup. Let v 1 , v 2 ∈ R |S| . Then,
where 1 is the one vector. The last relation holds since P µ,ν is a stochastic matrix and thus P µ,ν 1 = 1. By repeating the same argument for T µ,ν v 2 − T µ,ν v 1 and taking the sup-norm we conclude that
We now prove similar result on
By taking the sup-norm and using the fact T µ,ν is a γ-contraction, we conclude that T µ is also a γ-contraction. Similar argument establishes thatT ν is a γ-contraction.
Similar argument leads to T v 2 − T v 1 ≤ T µ,ν v 2 − T µ,ν v 1 for properly defined µ, ν. Again, by taking the sup norm and using the fact that T µ,ν is a γ-contraction we conclude the proof.
The following propositions relate the fixed-point of T µ ,T ν to the values and policies defined in 3. Furthermore, the last one establishes the fact the zero-sum MG has value.
Proposition 8. The following claims hold.
• Let µ ∈ P A , ν ∈ P B be stationary policies. The value v µ,ν is the fixed point of the operator T µ,ν , v µ,ν = T µ,ν v µ,ν .
• Given a policy ν ∈ P B , v ν = sup µ∈P A is the unique fixed point ofT ν . Furthermore, the sup is attainable in the set A.
• Given a policy µ ∈ P A , v µ = inf ν∈P B is the unique fixed point of T µ . Furthermore, the inf is attainable in the set B.
Proof. The proof of the first claim is standard, e.g., Puterman (1994) [Section 6.1]. By fixing a policy for any of the players the problem amounts for solving a single agent MDP (e.g., Puterman (1994) ). Due to Assumption 1, the reward and dynamics of the MDP are also continuous and bounded. Since the action set in compact for both player A and B, we can use Puterman (1994) [Theorem 6.2.10] and conclude the proof.
Proposition 9. The unique fixed point v * = T v * is also the equilibrium value of the zero-sum MG, v * = sup µ∈P A inf ν∈P B v µ,ν = inf ν∈P B sup µ∈P A v µ,ν , thus, the MG has a well defined value.
Furthermore, the stationary policies µ ∈ P A , ν ∈ P B for which v * =T v * = T v * = T µ,ν v * are in Nash-Equilibrium, and satisfy v µ ,ν * ≤ v * ≤ v µ * ,ν for any ν ∈ P B , µ ∈ P A .
Proof. See proof Patek (1997) 
Algorithm 3 Zero-Sum Markov-Game PI Initialize: ν 0 , k = 0 while stopping criterion is not satisfied do
Algorithm 4 Soft Zero-Sum Markov-Game PI Initialize: ν 0 , k = 0, η ∈ (0, 1] while stopping criterion is not satisfied do
A.2. Policy Iteration and Soft Policy Iteration for Zero-Sum Markov Games
In this section, we formulate two PI schemes that solve a zero-sum MG. The Zero-Sum MG PI scheme (see Alg. 3) is a well known one (Hoffman & Karp, 1966; Rao et al., 1973; Hansen et al., 2013) .
The Soft Zero-Sum MG PI (see Alg. 4) generalizes the usual PI. Instead of updating with a 1-step greedy policy it updates softly w.r.t. the 1-step greedy policy. Although this generalization has been analyzed extensively for a single-agent PI (e.g., (Kakade & Langford, 2002; Scherrer, 2014) ), to the best of our knowledge, it was not analyzed in the context of Markov-Games.
By generalizing arguments from (Scherrer, 2014) to framework of Zero-Sum MG (defined in Section A.1) we prove the following result.
As a corollary, and by plugging η = 1, we get the convergence rate of Zero-Sum MG PI. Notice that although the action space is continuous the proof follows using standard machinery, since the state space is still finite. We now give the proof of the theorem.
The proof has two steps. We first
Building on this fact, we prove the contraction property by generalizing technique from (Scherrer, 2014)[Theorem 1], to two player game.
The first relation holds due to Proposition 8, the forth relation holds by construction of ν , min ν∈P BT ν v µ k ,ν k = T ν v µ k ,ν k , the fifth relation is by Definition 4, the sixth relation holds since sum of maximum elements is bigger than the maximum of a sum, and the seventh relation holds since the fixed-policy Bellman operator satisfies T µ,(1−η)ν1+ην2 = (1 − η)T µ,ν1 + ηT µ,ν2 .
Due to the monotonicity ofT (1−η)ν k +ην (e.g, Patek (1997) [Appendix A]), we can repeatedly use (5),
where v k+1 = v µ k+1 ,ν k+1 . Indeed,T (1−η)ν k +ην is the optimal Bellman operator given a fixed adversary strategy,
Lastly, we show that in each iteration v * ≤ v k . For any adversarial strategy ν k ,
Where the third relation holds by Proposition 9.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 10.
where the first relation holds since v k+1 = v µ k+1 ,(1−η)ν k +ην and the second relation holds since T µ,ν is a monotone operator and v k+1 ≤ v k by Lemma 11.
Consider the first term in (6).
The first relation holds since T µ k ,ν k v k = max µ∈P A T µ,ν k v k and the second relation holds since by definition v k = v µ k ,ν k = T µ k ,ν k v µ k ,ν k (due to Proposition 8).
Remember that ν ∈ arg min ν∈P BT ν v k (as in the update of Alg. 4). Thus,
where the third relation is due to Lemma 6. Now, for the second term in (6) we have that,
The first relation holds since v * is the fixed point of T , and the third relation holds by (8).
Plugging (7) and (9) to (6) yields,
Since 0 ≥ v * − v k+1 by Lemma 11, we can take the max-norm and conclude the proof,
where the first relation holds by the triangle inequality and the second holds since T is a γ-contraction by Proposition 7.
B. Probabilistic Action Robust MDP
In this section, we focus on PR-MDPs (Section 3) and map the problem of solving the optimal probabilistic robust policy to solving a Zero-Sum MG. We then continue and provide the proofs of Section 3, which are mostly corollaries to the results in Section A.
For simplicity, we provide the definition of PR-MDPs as given in Section 3.
The optimal probabilistic robust value is v * P,α = v π * P,α P,α .
B.1. Probabilistic Action Robust MDP as a Zero-Sum Markov Game
Consider the single agent MDP on which the PR-MDP is defined, M = (S, A, P, R, γ).
Assumption 2.
• A is compact metric space.
• For any s ∈ S the reward r is continuous and bounded function on A.
• For any s ∈ S, whenever (a n ) → (a), where (a n ), (a) ∈ A, then P (· | s, a n ) converges weakly to P (· | s, a).
Solving the optimal probabilistic robust policy can be equivalently viewed as solving a Zero-Sum MG M P,α . Let M P,α = (S, A, A, P P,α , R P,α , γ). Meaning, its state-space is equal to that of the original MDP, the action space of the two players is the action space of the original MDP, and its discount factor is equal to the discount factor of M. Its reward and dynamics are given as follows, 
By Assumption 2 on M, Assumption 1 on the MG is satisfied.
It is easy to prove that a value v π mix P,α (π1,π2) defined on M is equal to the value v π1,π2 defined on M P,α . Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the problems, solving the later is equivalent to solving the first.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the Zero-Sum MG M P,α , and let P A be the set of all probability measures on the Borel Sets of A. We see that the Bellman operators of M P,α (Definition 4) decouples to two terms due to (10),
and similarly for T µ ,T ν and T µ,ν .
According to Proposition 9 the the optimal policy for the max-agent µ * satisfies v * = T v * = T µ * v * . Thus, µ * should satisfy
meaning, µ * ∈ max µ∈P A r µ + P µ v * which can always be solved by a deterministic policy.
B.3. Probabilistic Action Robust and Robust MDPs
Based on the mapping between a PR-MDP to a corresponding Zero-Sum MG B.1 the relation to Robust MDPs becomes apparent. Instead for the adversary to pick an action which induces a change in the dynamics and reward 10, the adversary can directly choose the dynamics and reward. Obviously, the value of such a policy is similar under this equivalent view. We conclude the result since the adversary is defined on the class of stochastic policies P(Π).
B.4. Proof of Proposition 2
Repeating the same arguments as in Policy Gradient Theorem (Sutton et al., 2000) [Theorem 1] for continuous action space we have that for any s ∈ S and π ∈ P(Π), i.e., any stochastic stationary policy,
Notice that we can replace the integration and differentiation order by Leibniz integral rule since ∇ π v π (s) exists and is bounded. Let h(· | s) be a deterministic probability measure on A. Similarly to (Scherrer & Geist, 2014) for any s ∈ S, ∇ π v π (s), h = s d π (s) a∈A ∇ π π(s, a), h q π (s, a)d a = s d π (s)q π (s, h(s)).
To minimize ∇ π v π (s), h we choose for any s ∈ S, a h ∈ arg min a q π (·, a) = arg min π r π + γP π v π .
B.5. Proof of Theorem 3
The theorem is a corollary of Theorem 10 and Proposition 2, while using the structure of the defined zero-sum MG for PR-MDP in Section B.1, M P,α .
Specifically, the first stage of the general Soft Zero-Sum MG PI 4 is similar to the first stage of Soft Probabilistic Robust PI 2. Furthermore, for M P,α it holds for any bounded v ∈ R |S| , arg min
where the first relation holds by definition 4, the second relation holds due to the specific form of the Bellman operators similarly to (11), and the third relation holds since the first term does not depend on ν.
By using Proposition 2 we get that Soft Probabilistic Robust PI 2 is an instance of the more general Soft Zero-Sum MG PI 4, and prove the Theorem as a corollary of Theorem 10.
C. Noisy Action Robust MDP as a Zero-Sum Markov Game
We focus on NR-MDPs (Section 4) and map the problem of solving the optimal noisy robust policy to solving a Zero-Sum MG. As in previous section, the proofs of Section 4, are mostly corollaries to the results in Section A.
For simplicity, we provide the definition of NR-MDPs as given in Section 3. Definition 2. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A Noisy Action Robust MDP is defined by the 5-tuple of an MDP (see Section 2.1). Let π,π be policies of an agent and an adversary. We define their noisy joint policy π mix N (π,π) as ∀s ∈ S, π mix N (a | s) ≡ E b∼π(·|s) b∼π(·|s)
Let π be an agent policy. For NR-MDP, its value is defined by v π N,α = minπ ∈Π E π mix N (π,π) [ t γ t r(s t , a t )], where a t ∼ π mix N (π(s t ),π(s t )). The optimal α-noisy robust policy is the optimal policy of the NR-MDP π * N,α ∈ arg max
The optimal noisy robust value is v * N,α = v π * N,α N,α .
C.1. Noisy Action Robust MDP as a Zero-Sum Markov Game
Consider the single agent MDP on which the NR-MDP is defined, M = (S, A, P, R, γ) and assume it satisfies Assumption 2. Solving the optimal probabilistic robust policy can be equivalently viewed as solving a Zero-Sum MG M N,α . Let M N,α = (S, A, A, P N,α , R N,α , γ). Meaning, its state-space is equal to that of the original MDP, the action space of the two players is the action space of the original MDP, and its discount factor is equal to the discount factor of M. Its reward and dynamics are given as follows,
Since the single agent MDP satisfies Assumption Assumption 2, the MG game defined by M N,α satisfies 1.
It is easy to prove that a value v π mix N (π1,π2) defined on the induced NR-MDP from M is equal to the value v π1,π2 defined on the MG M N,α . Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the problems, solving the later is equivalent to solving the first.
C.2. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider an MDP with a single state a quadratic reward of the form r(a) = a 2 where a ∈ [−1, 1]. In this case, the solution does not depend on the horizon and an optimal action w.r.t. a single time step will be the solution for the discounted reward. Denote P([−1, 1]) as the set of all probability measures on the Borel sets of [−1, 1].
If both of the players are only allowed to take deterministic actions, then the min-max and max-min values are not equivalent, 
Furthermore, we now show that considering random policies can increase the value. Let the policy of the max-player be P (a = −1) = P (a = 1) = 0.5, obviously, P ∈ P([−1, 1]). For this policy, we have that,
We conclude that for this example max 
C.3. Policy Iteration of NR-MDP
We can use the Soft Zero-Sum MG PI (see Algorithm 4), or, by fixing η = 1, Zero-Sum MG PI.
The algorithm repeats two stages of (i) solving an MDP by fixing the adversary policy, (ii) solving a 1-step greedy minimax decision problem on the set of stochastic policies. This comes in contrast to the corresponding PI algorithm that solves PR-MDP. There, stage (ii) involved in solving a single agent, 1-step greedy, decision problem. This problem can be more easily solved by function maximization.
Furthermore, this fact suggest that a simple Frank-Wolfe update (Frank & Wolfe, 1956) , as was performed in Soft Probabilistic Robust PI (Algorithm 2) would not work, at least not using the analysis we suggested here. Meaning, a relation between the maximal projection on the gradient ∇ π v π and the 1-step greedy minimax decision problem, as shown to hold in Proposition 2, would not exists.
D. Actor Gradients Proof
Proof. Our proof follows the proof of the deterministic policy gradients (DPG) (Silver et al., 2014) .
In order to retain consistency with (Silver et al., 2014) , we denote the deterministic policy π by µ : S → A. The parametrized policies µ θ andμθ are, respectively, the actor and adversary policies. We refer to the α-mixture policy µ α (µ θ ,μθ) simply as µ α (θ,θ), for ease of notation. 
NR-MDP:
Where p(s → s , t, π) denotes the density at state s after transitioning for t steps from state s. Iterating this formula leads to the following result:
Taking the expectation over S 1 : v π α (θ,θ) = A π joint P (u | s; θ,θ)Q π α (θ,θ) (s, π α (θ,θ)(s))du ∇ θ v π α (θ,θ) = ∇ θ A π α (u | s; θ,θ)Q π α (θ,θ) (s, u)du = ∇ θ [(1 − α)Q π α (θ,θ) (s, µ θ (s)) + αQ π α (θ,θ) (s,μθ(s))]
= (1 − α)∇ θ Q π α (θ,θ) (s, µ θ (s)) + α∇ θ Q π α (θ,θ) (s,μθ(s))
we address each element, (1) ∇ θ Q π α (θ,θ) (s, µ θ (s)) and (2) Q π α (θ,θ) (s,μθ(s)), individually:
(1): Where p(s → s , t, π) denotes the density at state s after transitioning for t steps from state s.
(2): S ρ π α (θ,θ) ∇ θ π θ (s)∇ a Q π α (θ,θ) (s, a) | a=π θ (s) d s the resulting gradient update for the actor does not directly take into consideration the policy of the adversary, thus resulting in a gradient rule similar (weighted by (1 − α) for the actor and α for the adversary) to that seen in Silver et al. (2014) .
Intuitively, as the action is sampled w.p.
(1 − α) from the actor and w.p, α from the adversary, each player acts greedily at the immediate step ignoring potential perturbations. The mutual effect of the actor and adversary is attained through the Q value which captures the long term return of the mixture policy. Figure 4 presents a block diagram of our approach for the NR-MDP scenario: We improve the actor (adversary) by taking the gradient of Q w.r.t. θ(θ) and performing backpropagation through the critic. Autograd engines (Baydin et al., 2018) automatically ensure that the gradients propagate directly to the actor (adversary) without affecting the adversary (actor) or the critic. During exploration we simply play π mix N a deterministic policy (as it is a convex sum of two deterministic values).
For the PR-MDP the schema is similar to the standard DDPG approach. Figure 6 presents the approach during training. This approach is identical to the standard DDPG approach, except that once taking the gradient ∇ θ Q(s, µ θ (s)), we multiply the loss (similar to a change of learning rate) by 1 − α.
The critic is trained on the expectation over the mixture policies, which in the case of DDPG results in Q(s, a) = r(s, a) + γ[(1 − α)Q(s , µ(s )) + αQ(s ,μ(s ))].
